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ABSTRACT 
Multilateral Trade Agreement occurs when countries come together and agree to discriminate 
against non-members of the group by means of removing trade barriers among themselves while 
maintaining such barriers against “third” countries. Developments in both multilateralism and 
regionalism have raise issues of trade policy strategies. At the country level, it raises issues of 
which best trade policy strategy to adopt. Consequently, this paper examines Nigeria’s trade 
policy in the light of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Nigeria’s response to these exciting 
developments is with a view to helping to chart an improved strategy for effectively taking 
advantage of them, as well as defending its rights in the evolving world trading system. Put more 
broadly, this paper examines what the developments portend for Nigerian’s development 
strategies. It discusses the process of charting the way forward for Nigeria and examines the 
role of complementary policies in the development process, bearing in mind that trade policy, 
being one of many development policies, requires the support of other policies and programmes 
to produce optimum results. 
Key words: Trade policy, Development, Tariffs, Structural Adjustment Programme, and 
Import Substitution. 
INTRODUCTION: 
          Nigeria‟s trade policies seem to have recognized the need for an effective trade policy, in 
the light of developments in the global scene. The Trade document entitled: Trade Policy of 
Nigeria is a bold step in recognizing the need to be proactive at both the regional and 
multilateral levels of trade negotiations. Apart from focusing on the provision of trade support 
infrastructure required for international standard support services to producers and exporters, 
the document‟s provision have been designed to eliminate trade distortions. Thus, trade 
information service, quality certification, and control are some of trade support infrastructure 
identified. The institutional frame work for policy implementation has also been revisited. A 
National Focal Point (NFP) on multilateral trading matters has been established as a forum for 
systematic consultation or collaboration among the various government agencies.  
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Similarly, an inter-ministerial Trade Policy Advisory Council, a Nigeria Trade and Competition 
Commission and a National Council on commerce are among the trade institution scheduled for 
establishment. The document also identifies possible challenges in the process of implementing 
the policy and recommends an appropriate implementation strategy. However, as has often 
been the Nigerian experience, most of the provisions of the document have, so far, not been 
implemented.  
         The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was established in 1947, but it was 
January 1995 that it was replaced by the World Trade Organization (WTO). This was an 
historical land mark in the world trading system. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is 
significantly different from General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in many respects, 
perhaps most profoundly in the sense that while the GATT only provided a provisional avenue 
for dialogue and coordination of the rules and regulations on international trade, the WTO 
Commitments are full, permanent and enforceable. Moreover, while the provisions of GATT 
were mainly applied to merchandise, the WTO Commitments have extended the frontiers of 
trade to include services and trade-related aspects of intellectual property. Apart from 
attempting to correct the selective nature of multilateral agreements that were introduced to 
GATT in the 1980s, the introduction of a single undertaking clause makes most of the WTO 
provisions multilaterally binding without an exception. The mechanism for settling disputes in 
the WTO framework promises to be faster and more effective than in the old GATT system.  
         Nigeria as a developing country, the notable changes in the World‟s Trading System 
(WTS) have been in the alterations to the structure of special and differential treatment and, 
hence, the ability of Nigeria to cope with the requirements for effective participation in the 
process of taking advantage of the system and in defending her rights.  
Prior to the Uruguay Round (UR), multilateral trade negotiations had been the main feature of 
trade among developing countries; special and differential treatments were usually handed 
down to developing countries in the form of exemptions (Oyejide, 2004).  
          The WTO has changed all that. Now, special and differential treatments are mainly in the 
form of longer periods of implementation and a lower rate of reduction in commitments. The 
expanded range of issues that has to be taken on boards, as a result of a single undertaken 
clause, also complicates participation by most developing countries.  
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As most of the commitments are time bound and coupled with lack of capacity to effectively 
participate, Nigeria like most developing countries is overwhelmed by the range of complex 
issues. The post 1995 period has also witnessed a significant increase in the number of countries 
acceding to the multilateral trade institution; from 134 countries in 1994, WTO members had 
increase to 144, as of April 2002. Two members, Cambodia and Nepal, were also welcome to 
the fold at the 5
th
 ministerial conference held in Cancun in September 2003. Currently, 26 
Countries are at various stages of accession to the organization. As the multilateral trading 
system becomes more complex, its membership has also been expanding and WTO members 
currently account for 90 percent of the world trade. Membership of the WTO has also increase 
in tandem with the number of regional trading arrangements (RTAs). While about 98 regional 
integration agreements were notified to GATT from 1947 to 1994 (WTO, 1995), the number of 
such agreements had increased to 176 as at the end of December 2003 (WTO, 2003). The 
phenomenal increase in the number of RTAs, which has taken place in parallel with increasing 
activities at multilateral level, is a pointer to the important role assigned to trade in the growth 
and development processes of world economies. 
THE CONCEPTS OF TRADE CREATION AND TRADE DIVERSION: THE NIGERIA 
EXAMPLE  
Trade is created when a lower cost source of supply from a partner country is substituted for a 
higher cost domestic source in one or more of the member countries of an RTA. Trade is 
diverted when imports from a low cost country outside the RTA are displaced by imports from a 
higher cost partner country as a result of the elimination of tariffs in trade with partner 
countries. 
        Assume that Nigeria imports a particular product from both Ghana and the United 
Kingdom (UK), say chocolate bars. The hypothetical import figures of Nigeria from Ghana (a 
member of the RTA) and from the UK (a non-member of the RTA) before formation of the 
RTA, a unit of chocolate was imported at a cost of say 100 dollar from Ghana and 110 dollars 
from the UK. A tariff of 20% raised the imported price to 120 dollars and 132 dollars in Ghana 
and the UK respectively. In this case Ghana is still confirmed as the choice of a rational 
Nigerian importer.  
 But, if the RTA was between Nigeria and the UK, and Ghana now became a “third” 
country, then the removal of tariffs on the UK goods by Nigeria as a result of a new RTA 
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arrangement would make the UK, rather than Ghana, the choice of a rational Nigerian importer. 
If the existing tariff prior to formation of the RTA between Nigeria and Ghana were low, say, 
5%, then the formation of an RTA between Ghana and Nigeria would not affect the choice of 
the UK as the preferred supplier by Nigerian importers. This example illustrates some features 
of an RTA: It can either be trade–creating (first scenario) or trade-diverting (second scenario). 
Its effects would depend on the level of tariffs prior to the formation of an RTA; the higher the 
tariffs, the higher probability of trade diversion. The relative cost structure of the members and 
non-members of an RTA would also play a significant role in the outcomes of trade effects of 
an RTA. As a first–best approach to multilateral trade liberalization, the WTO, like its 
predecessor, the GATT, is founded on the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination. 
Various negotiating round have been contributed to a significant reduction in the average level 
of tariffs, especially in industrial products. The Uruguay Round, being the eight in the round of 
negotiation under the GATT and concluded in 1994 after about eight years of excruciating 
negotiations, gave birth to a major reform in the history of multilateral trade negotiations.  
          As noted earlier, the WTO is significantly different from GATT in that, unlike the latter, 
the arrangement requires effective participation: Fearing that the activities of RTAs might create 
obstacles to free trade, some provisions of the GATT/WTO protocols are aimed at checking 
possible abuses of RTAs. In particular, the WTO is mainly concerned about enshrining the 
principle of reciprocity and non-discrimination in RTAs. Hence Article XXIV of GATT 1947, 
which has also been adopted by the WTO, allows RTAs on the following conditions: that trade 
barriers, on average, after integration is not higher or more restrictive than prior to the 
establishment of any RTAs; that all intra-regional barriers are removed within a reasonable 
length of time; and that RTAs are notified to the WTO council, Similarly, Article V of the 
General Agreement on Trade in services (GATs) requires that RTAs should have substantial 
sectoral coverage (number of sectors, volume of trade affected, and modes of supply); provide 
for the absence or substantial elimination of all measures violating national treatment in sectors 
where specific sectors were made in GATs; and does not result in higher trade barrier against 
third countries.  
        The observed increased in the number of RTAs in recent years can be explained in terms of 
economic as well as political motivations (WTO, 1995 and 2003 and World Bank, 2000.) The 
Economic motivations include, in particular, the need to approach Trade liberalization (TL) on a 
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piece meal, meaning selective basis and to shut out the most efficient suppliers in areas where 
the regional members cannot compete internationally. There is an apparent lack of enthusiasm 
on the part of some governments to become committed at the multilateral level, possibly 
because of the irreversibility of commitment and the negligible influence that those 
governments can wield at the multilateral level (Ogunkola, 2004). RTAs would seem to provide 
the needed succour in this situation. RTAs may come about as a result of the willingness of 
some countries to go deeper into certain areas which are not of interest to other members of the 
WTO. The negotiating process of the WTO may be considered rather time consuming and 
expensive relative to the volume of the country‟s trade. In addition, the capacity to negotiate at 
the multilateral level may simply not be there. All of this may push a government to consider an 
RTA as a better option.  
          Governments may also fear the exclusion of their countries from certain markets and 
therefore, struggle to participate in them (the domino effects). The need to protect preference 
margins and prevent preference erosion may also spur some countries, particularly those with 
small economies, into seeking an RTA with their major trading partners. The need to attract FDI 
and the credibility offered by such North-South relationship, may explain the popularity of this 
type of RTAs in recent years (WTO, 2003).  
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT) AND WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION (WTO) OBJECTIVES AND AS INSTRUMENTS FOR TRADE 
POLICY 
          The structure of the emerging multilateral trading system has long recognized the role of 
other complementary policies as long as they do not, directly or indirectly, constitute trade 
restrictions. For example, that agreement on Agriculture of the WTO allows the use of different 
production support mechanisms: domestic support in the form of subsidies is permitted, with 
certain restrictions. Similarly, there are provisions for dealing with unfair trading practices. 
There are even provisions for meeting the transition costs of implementing the agreements.  
Perhaps, the missing link at the country level is the inability to inculcate the required discipline 
and to properly situate the emerging multilateral trading scenario within the national goals and 
developmental aspirations. So, what does it take to formulate an optimal tariff policy?  
        The elements of an optimal tariff policy are justified on various grounds, including the 
desire to eliminate distortions in consumption and production, the need to protect an infant 
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industry and promote self –sufficiency and the desire to boost revenue generation to mention a 
few (Oyejide, 1998). Assuming a distortion – free economy and the existence of relatively 
superior alternatives to protect infant industries, the objective of revenue generation and other 
related issues would require less emphasis on imposing tariffs on the external trade of a country. 
Thus, issues in the formulation of an optimal trade policy would include the treatment of 
imported intermediate inputs; as well as the relative level of distortion that tends to inform the 
structure of tariffs. Thus, the issues border on whether or not tariffs should be uniform or not.  
            A tariff policy necessarily distinguishes and ranks three categories of objectives of 
import protection, industrial development, and fiscal balance. Import protection is borne out of 
the desire to be self-sufficient in the production of some items, such as food. The industrial 
development objectives is derived from the prescription of an import- substitution 
industrialization strategy that supports the need to protect infant industries, while the fiscal 
balance objective is derived from the taxing powers of government. Since these objectives are 
not necessarily complementary, they are usually prioritized in the process of implementation. 
The effectiveness of tariffs in achieving these objectives rests critically on the level of 
institutional development of a particular country, its adopted development strategy, and the 
availability of other alternative policy instruments to handle the various objectives. It has been 
argued that only the import protection objectives belongs to the domain of international trade in 
which trade, and particularly tariff policy, is most appropriate. In the same vein, industrial and 
domestic tax policies seem best suited to the protection of infant industries and revenue 
generation objectives respectively. The usual practice is to push the overarching objective 
forward at any given time while other objectives are pursued with less emphasis. (Obadan, 
1993). Uniform tariffs are easy to administer and are helpful in minimizing deliberate 
misclassification of imports, etc.  
The adoption of a uniform tariffs theoretically plausible and can be justified on efficiency 
grounds when the objective of trade policy is only to restrict the value of imports at world prices 
(i.e., the self-sufficiency argument). The advantages of a uniform tariff are many and may be 
enumerated as follows: It is transparent and easy to administer as it minimizes the tendency to 
misclassify goods and, hence, reduces delays in the process of customs clearances; it serves as 
deterrence to directly unproductive, profit – seeking activities aimed at obtaining higher tariffs. 
Agitation for higher tariffs tends to be minimized under the uniform tariff regime, especially 
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where it is costly to organize pressure groups to lobby for higher tariff rates; and finally, a 
uniform tariff confers equal protection on all sectors of an economy.  
        A non – uniform tariff regime would be optimal only when the protection of an infant 
industry and revenue generation were the major objectives of an economy. The presence of 
smuggling, economies of scale, and imperfect competition would tend to further compound the 
implementation of uniform tariffs and increase support for preferring a non-uniform tariffs 
regime (Egwaikhide, 1997). 
NIGERIA’S TRADE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE LIGHT OF 
GATT AND WTO 
          Nigeria‟s trade policy seem to have recognized the need for an effective trade policy, in 
the light of GATT and WTO which dictate economic development to a very large extend in the 
global scene. Notwithstanding the significant role which trade has played in the development of 
Nigeria, an appreciation of the role and value of a strategic trade policy in the process has been 
less than satisfactory. This situation partly explains the country‟s almost total and continuing 
dependence on a single, raw export commodity, oil.  
          The proposition here is that unless the country adopts a strategic trade policy stance, it 
would be difficult for it to realize its goal of diversifying and increasing the value of exports. 
Nigeria‟s pre-SAP (Structural Adjustment programme) trade policy had been directed mainly at 
addressing the problems associated with a deteriorating balance of payments (BOP) Position 
and, especially, in ensuring an increase in, and easy collection of, government revenue, (Obadan 
1993). Even when a trade policy was adopted as part of import substitution industrialization 
(ISI) Strategy, it was still subjugated to the twin objectives of managing the BOP – associated 
problems and generating government revenue. Indeed, the high tariff walls that had been built in 
the implementation of the ISI strategy had also served as a source of government revenue and a 
check on BOP – associated problems; the corresponding trade policy had protected finished 
goods at the expense of imported raw materials and capital goods.  
High tariffs and import license requirements (quantitative restrictions in general) had been the 
main instruments used to pursue the goals of an ISI strategy. While the Nigerian Federal 
Government had recognized the dangers of pursuing such an ISI strategy early enough; it had 
failed to avoid succumbing to the dangers. And most disturbingly, a high–cost industrial 
economy was emerging, thereby making Nigerian manufactured goods grossly uncompetitive.            
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        The success of an export promotions strategy also depends on the formulation and 
implementation of a strategic trade which has emerged as a viable alternative to the failed ISI 
strategic, if the support and recommendations of the Brettonwood institutions and the 
experiences of Japan and other East Asia countries are anything to go by. Although the goal of 
diversifying Nigeria‟s export products and markets had been recognized as early as the 1960s, 
an export – oriented industrialization strategy first received the necessary boost under the 
structural Adjustment programme (SAP). The corresponding trade policy that had emerged was 
trade liberalization, through a reduction in tariffs and non-tariff measures, and the creation of 
export incentives.  
        A unilateral trade liberalization had been adopted and there had been so much attempt to 
harmonize it with existing regional trade liberalization policies, under the auspices of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), neither was the trade liberalization 
(TL) that had been achieved under SAP locked in under the Uruguay Round (UR) ( 1986 – 
1994) multilateral trade negotiations. Similar to the implementation of an ISI strategy and the 
corresponding restrictive trade policies of high tariffs and quantitative restrictions, the 
implementation of an export oriented industrialization strategy has been equally faulted on 
many grounds. It has failed on account of stability as the country is drifting away from the 
“tariffs only” provision of the WTO. This is evident in the expansion in the list of items on 
import prohibition and other quantitative measures. Nigeria‟s current trade policy lacks 
transparency, at least on two grounds: (1) The wide gap between bound and applied rate, and (2) 
the incompatibility of domestic policies and institutions with the WTO standards. There is the 
need to move from the current “ceiling” binding to „floor‟ binding and to align the domestic 
polices and institutions with the WTO standards, if investors and trading partners are to take the 
country seriously. Nigeria‟s scheme of export incentives is also fraught with problems. 
Government‟s export incentives assistance has remained largely general and lacking in focus, 
uncoordinated and under funded and, hence, generally ineffective.  
Ajakaiye, (1985), Obadan, (1993), and Egwaikhide, (1997), have respectively dwelt on different 
aspects of export promotion in Nigeria and the possible ways of improving performance in the 
sector. Targeting products for export promotion at the micro level, as is being currently 
suggested, also raises some challenges relating to the structure of the economy, especially the 
characteristics of the targeted actors. There must be a deliberate programme of linking the 
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products with the intermediate users at a minimum cost. In the case of the agro-allied chain of 
production, for example, there is also the need to ensure that farmers will not be penalized as a 
result of responding positively to the incentives when there is an increase in the demand for 
their products by the firms that are processing them for export (Ajakaiye, 1998). 
         One recurring issue is that various government activities point to a lack of coordination 
among unilateral, bilateral and multilateral efforts. For example, the review of tariff rates, 
sequel to the expirying of the second seven year tariff regime, is still being awaited, three year 
after the reviewed edition was supposed to have taken off! It is doubtful if the review would, in 
any significant way, incorporate the regional agreement at the ECOWAS level, neither is there 
any assurance that it would take into consideration the on going negotiations towards an 
economic partnership agreement with the European Union. The African Growth Opportunity 
Act (AGOA) is also not in any way related to other negotiations, similar, multilateral trade 
negotiations, under the auspices of the WTO, are also taking place separately from, and without 
any explicit reference to, other levels of negotiations or agreements. 
        A related feature is that the Nigerian government agencies responsible for these 
negotiations and trade matters are diverse, and there is no evidence of coordination of their 
stance regarding issues. The federal ministry of finance is the most prominent agency in the 
review of custom duties while the new ministry of cooperation and interaction in Africa dictates 
the tune in matters relating to the ECOWAS and the African Union (AU). The implementation 
mechanism for taking advantage of the US-led Africa Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) is 
under a special Adviser who reports directly to the president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
Similarly, a special Adviser is in charge of matters relating to the New Economic Partnership 
for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD), and the federal ministry of commerce is coordinating the 
country‟s position on issues relating to multilateral trade negotiations.  
 
While the routine involvement of various government agencies in the process of initiating and 
conducting negotiation cannot be ruled out, the lack of coordination and understanding of basic 
issues and procedures in the terms of the internal workings of the WTO is clearly hampering the 
effectiveness of integrating the Nigerian economy into the emerging world trading system. 
 CONCLUSION  
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        In summary, neither a pure ISI strategy nor its export – oriented counter part would be 
sufficient to meet Nigeria‟s quest for rapid economic development. An appropriately mixed 
strategy, with correspondingly mixed policies and trade policy instruments, is strongly 
recommended. Such a strategy must be pursued within an integrated frame work and, hence, a 
coordinated negotiating frame work would be required to make it effective.  
          The arguments of this part of our analysis and their implications for Nigeria, non-trade 
objectives, such as peace and security, promotion of good governance and good neighborliness, 
have tended to dominate the country‟s activities at the level of ECOWAS deliberations; effort at 
coordinating and harmonizing policies, projects, programmes and institutions as pre-requisites 
for boosting intra-regional trade seem to be a low level priority. There is, therefore, the need to 
harness the potential for a more robust regional trade and economic integration among member 
states of the sub-region and explore more actively the benefits from Nigeria‟s participation in 
such arrangement. But Nigeria should also be actively involved at the multilateral level, 
especially in seeking better market access for its products, pressing for more favourable special 
and differential treatment, and in defending its rights.  
          Thus, a mixed strategy that combines regionalism with multilateralism should be explored 
in maximizing the benefits accruing to Nigeria at both levels. The Nigeria‟s trade policy must 
be designed within the general context of economic development objectives and goals. An 
effective trade policy directed at promoting industrial development would necessarily be 
situated within a strong and well-articulated industrial policy. Without first determining the 
overall goal of an economy and the specific role that trade policy would play in the overall 
scheme, trade policy would be reduced to mere stabilization measures, rather than playing its 
best suited role of promoting a country‟s development in the medium to long run. (Federal 
Minisry of Commerce, 2000). The emphasis on maximizing government revenue from taxes on 
international trade seems generally misplaced; the trend is to develop better tax instruments.  
Similarly, the use of quantitative restriction instruments appears misguided in that, apart from 
being against the multilateral trade agreements, its administrative cost is usually exorbitant. 
Trade policy is not a panacea for all economic ills and, even where its potency is high, different 
trade policy instruments and the ways they are structured should be objectively evaluated and 
carefully applied. 
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           Finally, multilateral trade negotiations implicitly assume the existence of a coherent 
economic growth and development plan and or strategy at the national level; the role of the 
WTO and its members is, essentially, to ensure that multilateral trade rules and commitments 
help to promote the achievement of national economic goals. Consequently, only products 
which give Nigeria a global comparative advantage should be considered for liberalization at 
the multilateral level. Regional integration at ECOWAS and AU levels should be developed as 
a stepping stone to opening up the economy to global competition. In this way, the regional 
trade arrangement would serve as a voice to be reckoned with at the multilateral level, in 
addition to maintaining security and promoting good governance in the region. The Federal 
Government should consider the establishments of a council on trade consistency of 
agreements, but also ensure that national goals are not compromised in the process of trade 
negotiations. Coherent policies and particularly trade policy and different negotiations cannot be 
over emphasized.  
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